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Nontechnical Summary
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s stated goal is the
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992,
Article 2). Given some stabilization or likewise temperature targets, rational climate policy
should minimize the net economic costs of limiting temperature change. Cost-effectiveness
suggests that the marginal costs of emission control should be equalized across all sources in
space and time. This comes down to comprehensive “where“, “when”, and “what”-flexibility.
With the first, reductions should take place where it is cheapest, regardless of the
geographical location. With the second, reductions should take place when the cost-benefit
calculus yields a positive value. With the third, decisions can be taken on what greenhouse
gas should be abated under cost-effectiveness considerations.
While the potentials for efficiency gains from “where”-flexibility have been investigated
in broader detail, quantitative analysis of “when”-flexibility and “what”-flexibility is rather
limited. The reason is that an appropriate treatment of “when”- and “what”-flexibility requires
a sophisticated long-term analytic framework that combines some form of climate model with
a model of global economic activity.
The primary objective of this paper is to lay out such an integrated framework for
evaluating efficient multi-gas emission control strategies. We present a multi-sector, multi-
region computable general equilibrium model (PACE) that features a reduced from
representation of the key links between anthropogenic emissions of different greenhouse gases
and climate change (radiative forcing and temperature). Based on numerical simulation with
this integrated assessment model we investigate the importance of “what”-flexibility on top of
“where”- and “when”-flexibility for alternative emission control schemes that prescribe long-
term temperature targets and eventually impose additional constraints on the rate of
temperature change. We find that “what”-flexibility substantially reduces the compliance
costs under alternative emission control schemes. When comparing policies that simply
involve long-term temperature targets against more stringent strategies that include additional
constraints on the rate of temperature increase, it turns out that the latter involve huge
additional costs. These costs may be interpreted as additional insurance payments if damages
should not only dependent on absolute temperature change but also on the rate of temperature
change.
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Abstract
We investigate the importance of “what”-flexibility on top of “where”- and “when”-flexibility
for alternative emission control schemes that prescribe long-term temperature targets and
eventually impose additional constraints on the rate of temperature change. We find that
“what”-flexibility substantially reduces the compliance costs under alternative emission
control schemes. When comparing policies that simply involve long-term temperature targets
against more stringent strategies that include additional constraints on the rate of temperature
increase, it turns out that the latter involve huge additional costs. These costs may be
interpreted as additional insurance payments if damages should not only dependent on
absolute temperature change but also on the rate of temperature change.
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11.  Introduction
Flexibility is a central element in market-based economies in order to foster the efficient use
of scarce resources. In the context of climate policy, efficiency translates into questions of
how much and what anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should be abated, when,
and where, i.e. by whom. Given complete information, comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
could deliver precise answers to these questions. However, neither costs nor benefits of GHG
emission abatement are easy to quantify. In particular, there are large uncertainties in external
cost estimates for climate change. The chain of causality – from GHG emissions to ambient
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, from temperature increase to physical effects such
as climatic and sea level changes – is very complex. Moreover, economists do not even agree
on the methodology to be used for valuing such potential climate change impacts as the
extinction of a species. The large uncertainties in predicting global climate change, as well as
quantifying and monetizing the associated biophysical impacts explain much of the
controversy on the desirable long-term level of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and
the scope and timing of emission mitigation measures.
Presuming that uncertain future outcomes of climate change could be extreme and
irreversible, risk aversion may justify the adoption of a precautionary cost-effectiveness
approach rather than hinging on traditional cost-benefit analysis (Gollier et al. 2000). In this
vein, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aims at
establishing an ample margin of safety based on recommendations from natural science on
“tolerable” emission levels. The UNFCCC’s stated goal is the “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992, Article 2). In its Third Assessment
Report the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which serves as the scientific
advisory board to the UNFCCC, laid out several long-term stabilization scenarios for
greenhouse gas emissions with an associated range of expected increases in the global mean
temperature (IPCC 2001). Given some stabilization or likewise temperature targets, rational
climate policy should minimize the net economic costs of limiting temperature change. Cost-
effectiveness suggests that the marginal costs of emission control should be equalized across
all sources in space and time.1 This comes down to comprehensive “where“, “when”, and
“what”-flexibility. With the first, reductions should take place where it is cheapest to do so,
                                                
1 Note that - in contrast to cost-benefit analysis – it is no longer assured that marginal costs are equal to the
marginal benefits of emission reduction.
2regardless of the geographical location. With the second, reductions should take place when
the cost-benefit calculus yields a positive value. With the third, decisions can be taken on
what greenhouse gas should be abated under cost-effectiveness considerations.
While the potentials for efficiency gains from “where”-flexibility have been investigated
in broader detail (see e.g. Weyant 1999), the implications of “when”-flexibility have been
analyzed less intensively, and there are only relatively few studies that have addressed aspects
of “what”-flexibility. There are good reasons for the shortage of studies on “when”- and
“what”-flexibility. First, the quality of data for sources and abatement options of GHGs other
than CO2 is poor. Second, an appropriate analysis of “when”- and “what”-flexibility demands
for integrated assessment of economic and climatic relationships in a dynamic framework that
poses considerable challenges to modeling. Third, the long-term nature of climate change
implies substantial uncertainties in economic analysis as it requires tenuous assumptions on
the business-as-usual development that will be a key driver for adjustment costs to some
climate policy objective.
Against this background, the primary objective of this paper is to ascertain the relative
importance of a multi-gas emission control strategy (in our case: CO2 and CH4) vis-à-vis a
CO2-only abatement strategy. In other words: We want to sort out how much can be gained if
we put “what”-flexibility on top of “where”- and “when”-flexibility. The explanatory power
of such a comparison depends crucially on the proper design of the overall analytical
framework. Therefore, we place special emphasis on the description of the baseline
calibration and the integration of climate relationships into PACE, a dynamic multi-sector,
multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade and energy use.
Based on numerical simulation with this integrated assessment model we find that
“what”-flexibility substantially reduces the compliance costs under alternative emission
control schemes. When comparing policies that simply involve long-term temperature targets
against more stringent strategies that include additional constraints on the rate of temperature
increase, it turns out that the latter involve huge additional costs. These costs may be
interpreted as additional insurance payments if damages should not only dependent on
absolute temperature change but also the rate of temperature change. Our calculations also
confirm the shortcomings of the global warming potential (GWP) approach to represent the
contribution of different greenhouse gases to global temperature change because the relative
contribution may vary substantially over time.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the generic general
equilibrium framework that serves as a starting point for subsequent extension to accommodate
integrated assessment of multi-gas abatement strategies. Section 3 describes the baseline
calibration of our model to long-term projections on economic growth and energy use. Section 4
elaborates the inclusion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (in our case: CH4). Section 5 provides a
summary of the reduced-form climate sub-module and its linkage to the energy-economy model.
Section 6 outlines the policy scenarios and interprets the simulation results. Section 7 concludes.
2.  Generic Model Structure
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have become the standard tool for the
analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource
allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (see e.g. Bergmann
1990, Grubb et al. 1993, Weyant 1999). The main reason for this is that the general
equilibrium framework represents price-dependent market interactions as well as the
origination and spending of income for various economic agents based on rigorous
microeconomic theory.
In this section, we lay out the generic structure of a multi-sector, multi-region CGE
framework of global trade and energy use. A multi-region framework is indispensable for the
analysis of global GHG emission constraints. In a world that is increasingly integrated through
trade, policy interference in open economies not only cause adjustment of domestic production
and consumption patterns but also influence international prices via changes in exports and
imports. The changes in international prices, i.e. the terms of trade, imply secondary effects,
which can significantly alter the impacts of the primary domestic policy (Böhringer and
Rutherford 2002). In addition to the consistent representation of trade links, a detailed tracking
of energy flows is a pre-requisite for the assessment of climate policies. Combustion of fossil
fuels is a driving force of global warming through the release of the man greenhouse gas CO2
(CH4 also originates to a significant share from fossil fuel production and consumption).
Beyond the comprehensive spatial coverage, climate policy analysis requires an explicit
dynamic framework since policy interference applies over longer time periods as climate change
is an inherently dynamic problem and happens on larger time scales. On the consumption side,
dynamics involve the representation of the savings behavior of households. On the production
side, dynamics involve the description of investment decisions of firms. To build dynamic
features into the modeling of the economic behavior of households and firms one has to make
4an assumption on the degree of foresight of the economic agents. Assuming that the agents in
the model know as much concerning the future as the modeler, implies a model with “consistent
expectations” or “perfect foresight” where all agents consistently anticipate all current and
future prices (“clairvoyance”). Such a framework reveals plausible effects of policy changes on
intertemporal consumption and investment (savings) decisions and allows for the measurement
of transitional effects that can be significant relative to long-term impacts.
Below, we first provide a short non-technical summary on the static intra-period sub-
module and then describe the dynamics of the overall model. Finally, we point out the
advantage of implementing the model in a mixed complementarity format rather than adopting a
nonlinear programming (optimization) approach.
2.1. The Static Sub-Module
Figure 1 lays out the diagrammatic structure of the single-period static sub-module that
underlies our dynamic multi-sector multi-region CGE model of global trade and energy use
PACE. Primary factors of a region r include labor, capital and resources of fossil fuels ff (crude
oil, coal, and gas). The specific resource used in the production of crude oil, coal and gas results
in upward sloping supply schedules. Production Yir of commodities i in region r, other than
primary fossil fuels, is captured by aggregate production functions which characterize
technology through substitution possibilities between various inputs. Nested constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) cost functions with several levels are employed to specify the KLEM
substitution possibilities in domestic production sectors between capital (K), labor (L), energy
(E) and non-energy intermediate inputs, i.e. material (M).
Final demand Cir of the representative agent RAr in each region is given as a CES
composite which combines consumption of an energy aggregate with a non-energy consumption
bundle. The substitution patterns within the non-energy consumption bundle as well as the
energy aggregate are described by nested CES functions. CO2 emissions are associated with
fossil fuel consumption in production, investment, and final demand.
All goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a
CES composite Air of the domestically produced variety and a CES import aggregate Mir of the
same variety from the other regions, the so-called Armington good (Armington, 1969).
Domestic production either enters the formation of the Armington good or is exported to satisfy
the import demand of other regions.
5Endowments of labor and the specific resources are fixed exogenously. Capital supplies are
price-responsive (see section 2.2.). Within any time period, we assume competitive factor and
commodity markets such that prices adjust to clear these markets.
Figure 1: Structure of the intra-period sub-module
2.2. Dynamics
The notion of consistent expectations is coupled with the simplifying assumption of an
infinitely-lived representative agent who makes explicit choices at the margin between current
and function consumption. The representative agent maximizes welfare subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint. In equilibrium the present value of consumption equals the
present value of income over the infinite horizon. Within a given period, however, a region may
run a current account surplus or deficit, depending on the difference between national income
and expenditure.2
Figure 2 illustrates the basic dynamics of the model. The representative agent for each
region maximizes his discounted utility over the model’s time horizon. The primary factors,
capital, labor, and energy are combined to produce output in period t. In addition, energy is
delivered directly to final consumption. Output is divided between consumption and investment,
and investment augments the (depreciated) capital stock in the next period. Capital, labor, and
the energy resource earn incomes, which are either spent on consumption or retained for
savings, i.e. investment.
                                                
2 Closure of financial flows within the model implies that the deficit is equal to the difference between the
value of commodity imports and commodity exports.
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Figure 2: Dynamic model settings
Investment is driven by consistent expectations where the return on investment (with
quadratic adjustment costs) is balanced against the cost of capital. In equilibrium, investments
are placed in the region (sectors) where they will receive the highest return. International capital
flows are thus endogenous, and the demand and supply of savings jointly determine the
international interest rate. The baseline equilibrium growth path is calibrated to a common
marginal product of capital in all regions. Capital stocks evolve through constant geometric
depreciation and new investment. Following Uzawa (1969), we assume that capital installation
costs depend on the rate of gross investment (relative to the existing capital stock). Given the
level of investment, the cost of new capital decreases when the capital stock increases and vice
versa. A quadratic installation cost function relates net to gross investment. For large adjustment
costs, rapid changes in the regional capital stock are costly and the model exhibits a slower
speed of adjustment of capital stocks to changes in the rate of return.3
Dynamic general equilibrium models exhibit a turnpike property, and one can exploit this
when an infinite horizon equilibrium must be approximated with a finite model. To assure
invariance of model results with respect to the time horizon, a set of appropriate terminal
conditions must be specified. We adopt here the strategy proposed by Lau et al. (2002) where (i)
terminal capital stocks are chosen to be consistent with smooth growth in investment in the final
                                                
3 Note that when there are no adjustment costs, the model reduces to the standard Ramsey model.
7periods of the model and (ii) terminal assets are determined in consistency with budget balance
and steady-state growth for the post-terminal horizon.
2.3. MCP Implementation
Algebraically, our model is implemented as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The
MCP formulation provides a general format for economic equilibrium problems that may not be
easily studied in an optimization context. Only if the complementarity problem is “integrable”
(see Takayma and Judge 1971), the solution corresponds to the first-order conditions for a
(primal or dual) programming problem. Given integrability, the nonlinear optimization problem
can be interpreted as a market equilibrium problem where prices and quantities are defined
using duality theory. In this case, a system of (weak) inequalities and complementary slackness
conditions replace the minimization operator (see e.g. Rutherford 1995).4 However, taxes,
income effects, spillovers and other externalities, interfere with the skew symmetry property
which characterizes first order conditions for nonlinear programs. In contrast to various models
for long-term policy assessment that adopt an explicit optimization approach (see e.g. Manne
and Richels 2001), our modeling framework is directly suited to investigate policy interference
in (real-world) second-best settings. Compared to equilibrium conditions cast as system of
equations the MCP framework allows for a straightforward representation of restrictions on
prices or quantities that may become binding in equilibrium or not. Numerically, the model is
implemented in MPSGE (Rutherford 1999) as a subsystem of GAMS (Brooke et al. 1986) using
PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995) for solving the MCP problem.
3.  Calibration
In quantitative policy analysis, the effects of policy interference are measured with respect to
a reference situation - usually termed business-as-usual (BaU) - where no policy changes
apply. When we want to simulate the potential effects of some policy measure, information
on the future BaU development is required. Apparently, the BaU projections are a crucial
determinant for the overall magnitude and distribution of adjustment costs For concreteness,
                                                
4 In this context, the term „mixed complementarity problem“ (MCP) is straightforward: „mixed“ indicates that
the mathematical formulation is based on weak inequalities that may include a mixture of equalities and
inequalities; „complementarity“ refers to complementary slackness between system variables and system
conditions.
8exogenous policy constraints such as stabilization or temperature targets will bind future
economies the more, the higher projected BaU growth in GHG emissions. Substantial
differences in model-based analysis can often be traced back to different assumptions about
the reference case. Yet, the central role of baseline assumptions in general receives little
attention in the literature. Regarding long-term climate policy analysis, the issue of baseline
projections becomes very critical in view of the tremendous uncertainties regarding BaU
developments over several decades. Not only is there the question why one baseline should be
preferable over another, but often projections based on partial equilibrium
judgements/analysis stand out for large internal inconsistencies.
Against this background, a careful documentation of the baseline calibration is a
conditio-sine-qua-non for the interpretation of results. In this section, we first describe the
consistency conditions to calibrate a dynamic model along the global steady-state growth
path. Second, we lay out a pragmatic approach how we can accommodate differential growth
rates across various regions while avoiding potentially large deterioration in the terms of trade
through the model horizon. Third, we sketch how exogenous projections on GHG emissions
(i.e. in particular fossil fuel use) can be incorporated in a plausible manner along with
projections of GDP growth rates. Fourth, we outline the inclusion of non-CO2 GHG
abatement possibilities. Fifth, we describe the concrete parameterization of the intertemporal
model that will be used for impact analysis of GHG alternative stabilization scenarios.
3.1. Steady-state calibration
The challenge in setting up a dynamic model is to reconcile the dynamic equilibrium
conditions in terms of the benchmark data that incorporates base-year values for capital
earnings, investment, and current account. Along the steady-state all quantities increase at the
exogenous growth rate, while all prices expressed as present values decline at some interest
rate (reflecting the pure rate of time preference). Steady-state growth implies mutual
consistency of growth and interest rates together with capital earnings and investment values.
However, in the benchmark data set, the steady-state conditions are typically not satisfied for
arbitrary assumptions on dynamic parameters such as the growth, interest, and depreciation
rates. If we assume plausible values for the latter parameters, the steady-state capital values
share implied by steady-state growth, e.g., differ substantially from reported base-year values.
To assure consistency and avoid re-calibration of the investment demand vector, one can
calibrate capital and other factor shares to match the capital values share implied by the base
9year investment. For identical growth rates across all regions, this data adjustment assures
consistency to steady-state growth.
3.2. Differential growth rates
In applied policy analysis, growth rate projections typically differ across regions. In this
situation, the baseline equilibrium must be computed. When regions grow at different rates,
there may be a substantial induced change in the terms of trade, and this makes it difficult to
calculate a baseline growth path that matches economic targets such as investment and
consumption. A pragmatic means of dampening changes in terms of trade for differentiated
baseline growth rates is to adjust Armington share parameters over time in proportion to
potential GDP. As a country grows faster, it is assumed that this produces an autonomous
(non-price induced) change in the demand for the country’s goods both in the home country
as well as for the rest of the world. Since there is no change in the efficiency as a result of
these demand adjustment, at base year prices, the cost of a unit of the aggregate commodity
remains unchanged, even though there may be a substantial difference in the relative growth
rates across countries. A final problem after the adjustment of Armington demand functions is
related to assets rather than terms of trade and becomes evident in deviations between
baseline and base year consumption. This reflects an inherent difficulty in setting up an
equilibrium growth model in which the base year is not on a steady-state growth path. The
level of net borrowing does not reflect earnings on assets - some of these capital flows
represent ongoing changes in net asset positions as countries move toward the long-run
equilibrium. In order to exactly replicate the base year consumption level, the level of net
assets in the base year can be treated as a variable which is computed endogenously. These
values are adjusted so as to produce a common base year consumption level in all regions.
3.3. Energy (Carbon) intensities
Standard baseline projections for climate or energy policy analysis include not only
exogenous information on future GDP, but also detailed accounts on fossil fuel use, world
market energy prices, and CO2 emission profiles. In order to incorporate the energy data, we
perform a two-step recalibration. First, we use the baseline intensities for fossil fuel demands
to re-scale the baseline cost shares in the production of the electric and non-electric energy
aggregates. In order to preserve the initial total costs per unit of production, we inversely
adjust the capital cost shares, meaning that energy efficiency improvements are not costless
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but are linked to the increased use of capital services. Within the BaU re-calculation, we
endogenously adjust the resource endowments of fossil fuels to calibrate the model to given
exogenous target prices for fossil fuels. In a second step, we then recalibrate fossil fuel supply
functions locally to match exogenous estimates of fossil fuel supply elasticities.
3.4. Parameterization
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, base year quantities and prices –
together with exogenous elasticities – determine the parameters of functional forms. The most
comprehensive base year statistics on global trade and energy use are provided by the GTAP5
database that features consistent accounts of regional production and consumption, bilateral
trade and energy flows for up to 66 countries/regions and 57 commodities in the year 1997
(Dimaranan and McDougall 2002).
Considering the regional resolution of our climate policy analysis, the binding constraint
comes from the availability of long-term baseline projections. Here we make use of the
WEC/IIASA database that includes projections for GDP, fossil fuel use and carbon as well as
methane emission profiles up to 2100 for eleven geo-politically important world regions and six
alternative long-term futures (WEC/IIASA 1998). In order to reduce the computational burden
for the numerical analysis, we have further aggregated the eleven regions to seven model
regions. The sectoral aggregation in the model has been chosen to distinguish carbon-intensive
sectors from the rest of the economy as far as possible given data availability. It captures key
dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement, such as differences in carbon
intensities and the degree of substitutability across carbon-intensive goods. The energy goods
identified in the model are coal, natural gas, crude oil, refined oil products and electricity.
Important carbon-intensive and energy-intensive non-energy industries that are potentially most
affected by carbon abatement policies are aggregated within a composite energy-intensive
sector. In order to keep track of the most important source for methane emissions, agriculture
forms an explicit sector. The remaining manufacturers and services are aggregated to a
composite industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good. The primary factors in the
model include labor, physical capital and fossil-fuel resources. Table 1 summarizes the regional,
sectoral, and factor aggregation of the model.
Among the six possible futures that are provided in the WEC-IIASA database, we use
scenario B as our reference case. Scenario B is based on a cautious approach to technological
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change and energy availability as well as, modest economic growth. Table 2 provides an
overview of central indicators for our reference scenario.
Table 1: Model dimensions
Production Sectors Countries and Regions
Energy North America (USA and Canada)
Coal Western Europe
Crude oil Pacific OECD (Japan, Australia, New Zealand)
Natural gas Newly independent states of the former Soviet Union
Refined oil products Central and Eastern Europe
Electricity Africa, Latin America, and Middle East
Non-Energy Asia
Agricultural production
Energy-intensive sectors Primary factors
Other manufactures and services Labor
Savings good Capital
Fixed factor resources for coal, oil and gas
Table 2: Main characteristics of WEC-IIASA scenario B (WEC/IIASA 1998)
Scenario B (“Middle course”)
Carbon emissions (GtC) 9.6 (in 2050) - 11.4 (in 2100)
World economic growth 2.2 % p.a.
Environmental taxes No
Carbon constraints No
4.  Non- CO2 Abatement Options
CO2 is the major anthropogenic greenhouse gas contributing to global warming. However,
other greenhouse gases including CH4, N2O, and a number of industrial process gases are also
relevant to climate change. In our multi-gas simulations below we track energy related
emission of CO2 and energy and non-energy emissions of CH4 as the most important non-
CO2 greenhouse gas. We endogenously determine the level of CO2 and CH4 emissions
thereby taking into account the various sources of anthropogenic CH4 emissions and the
technological options to abate them.
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Agriculture is a principal source of CH4 emissions. Especially the livestock sector
contributes through enteric fermentation and the (anaerobic) decomposition of manure to the
amount of CH4 emissions from the agriculture sector. An important source of CH4 emissions
in agriculture is rice cultivation. Fugitive CH4 emissions from natural gas and oil systems,
especially from the production, processing, transmission and distribution of natural gas are
considerably large. Less important are agricultural residue burning. Coal production (mining
and post-mining activities) also produces CH4 emissions through the process of coal
formation which results in CH4 that is stored in the coal. Municipal and industrial waste
(solid waste landfilling and wastewater treatment) leads to anaerobic decomposition of waste
and thereby CH4 emissions. Other CH4 emission sources include, e.g., stationary and mobile
combustion and biofuel combustion.
Table 3: CH4 sources, emission baseline and corresponding model sectors
CH4 emission sources EPA Baseline 2010
(in MMTCE)
Model sector
Rice cultivation 187.4 Agricultural
Enteric fermentation 557.9 Production
Manure management 65.3
Biomass burning (agricultural residue burning) 75.1
Coal production (underground and surface
mining and post-mining)
140.9 Coal
Crude oil production 19.4 Crude oil
Natural gas systems (production, processing,
transmission and distribution)
316.3 Natural gas
Industrial sewage (wastewater) Energy-int. sectors
Domestic sewage (wastewater) Household
Landfills of solid waste 239.0
Stationary and mobile combustion 19.2
Biofuel combustion 64.1
Other 5.5
Table 3 provides an overview of the CH4 sources, baseline emissions in 2010 provided
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (see “Reference” in this special
issue) and the mapping of CH4 sources to the sectors incorporated in our model.
Carbon emissions are directly linked to the combustion of fossil fuels. The key to lower
carbon emissions is thus the reduction of fossil fuel combustion. In contrast, emissions of
174.3
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other GHG gases cannot, in general, be tied in fixed proportions to activity (use) as there are
technical possibilities to reduce emissions per unit of activity. EPA provides bottom-up
estimates of the abatement potential for CH4 emission sources and the associated marginal
abatement costs (see “Reference” in this special issue). There are regional marginal
abatement cost curves (MAC) available for different activities: rice cultivation, enteric
fermentation, manure management, coal production, crude oil production, natural gas systems
and landfills of solid waste. More than 80 % of total anthropogenic CH4 emission are hence
supplemented with engineering information about technical options for potential emission
abatement. Figure 3 illustrates marginal abatement cost curves for different CH4 emission
sources in the year 2010.
Solid waste
Crude oil Agriculture
Natural gas Coal
Figure 3: Global marginal abatement cost curves for CH4 emission sources in 2010 (Source:
“Reference” in this special issue)
To incorporate the cascaded marginal abatement cost curves for CH4 in each sector and
region of our model, we first compute an equilibrium path of the counterfactual GHG
abatement scenario without CH4 abatement options. Next, we evaluate the solution with
respect to carbon prices. We then assume that all potential cost-effective CH4 abatement
options in each sector and region are implemented. We thus get a point estimate of CH4
abatement levels, marginal cost of abatement, and the average cost increase of CH4 abatement,
whereby the latter is given by the area under the marginal abatement cost curve divided by the
14
sectoral activity level. We then calculate the new temperature profile with the adjusted CH4
emissions. Using the new equilibrium path, we can update the CH4 abatement and cost
fractions. The iterative CH4 abatement algorithm converges quickly to a stable solution.
5.  The Climate Sub-Module
In order to assess climate change policy options we combine economic aspects of climate
change with scientific knowledge of the dynamics of climate change in an integrated
assessment model. Climate-change modeling is introduced through the geophysical module of
the RICE-99 (Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy) model (Nordhaus and
Boyer 2000). It contains a number of geophysical relationships that link together the different
forces affecting climate change. The geophysical relations are simplified representations of
more complex models and give a reduced form description of emissions, concentrations, and
globally averaged temperature change. Economic activity leads to CO2 emissions which
affect climate through their radiative forcing. The accumulation and transportation of CO2
emissions is modeled as a linear three-reservoir approach calibrated to existing carbon cycle
models. The three reservoirs represent the atmosphere, a quickly mixing reservoir in the
upper oceans together with the short-term biosphere, and the deep oceans. The accumulation
of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere leads to an increase in radiative forcing. This relationship
is derived from large-scale climate models: The radiative forcing equation includes the
forcings of other greenhouse gases (CH4, N2O, CFCs and ozone) and aerosols as an
exogenous component. The climate-change equations link radiative forcing and climate
change based on the three-box climate model representation. An increased radiative forcing
warms the atmosphere with some time lag due to the thermal inertia of the different ocean
layers.
In the RICE-99 environmental module only CO2 is endogenously modeled. Other
greenhouse gases and their radiative forcings are assumed to be exogenous. For our multi-gas
analysis we endogenize CH4 as the most important non-CO2 greenhouse gas. The calibration
of the extended environmental module is based on the MERGE climate module (Manne et al.
1994). Methane emissions result from different sources and are linked to economic activities
in the economic model. These emissions build up a CH4 stock. The base year stock of
methane is assumed to be 4.850 billion tons of CH4 of which 60 % are subject to decay with a
yearly retention factor of 8.3 % reflecting the atmospheric lifetime. The increase in the stock
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of methane leads to an increase in the radiative forcing of methane which is proportional to
the logarithm of the ratio of the current to the initial level and takes into account the
interaction effects of CH4 and N2O. The aggregate radiative forcing is again the sum of the
radiative forcing for CO2, CH4 and the other exogenous forcings. The temperature equations
remain unchanged.
Our algorithm for computing "when-efficient" tax profiles involves iterative computation
of the numerical derivatives of temperature with respect to greenhouse gas emissions (CO2
and CH4 in our case). It turns out that these partial derivatives are fairly stable, which makes
it possible to compute time-efficient tax profiles without resorting to an optimizing
framework.
Due to the large uncertainties in damage estimates for climate change, we do not attempt
to translate global warming into market impacts (such as productivitiy changes, capital
depreciation) and non-market impacts (such as biodiversity losses, natural disasters) (Manne
et al., 1995): There is only a one-way link between economic variables and biophysical
variables. As a consequence, the welfare analysis is solely driven by economy-wide
adjustment costs and restrictive GHG emissions control policies are necessarily welfare
decreasing (in the absence of major second-best effects due to initial market distortions). The
coupling of the economic system and climate system for our integrated CGE assessment is
depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Coupling of economic system and climate system for integrated CGE assessment
EmissionsPolicies Concentrations Temperature
Economy
Welfare
Non market impacts
Market impacts
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6.  Scenarios and Results
We distinguish two different climate control schemes. The first control scheme (Target) aims
at stabilizing the long-term global temperature at an exogenously given level from 2100
onwards. Such a policy reflects the precautionary principle adopted by the UNFCCC to
prevent global mean temperature rising beyond a certain threshold that could imply dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In our central case setting, temperature
may not increase more than 90 % of the BaU temperature increase in 2100. The second
control scheme (Rate) imposes an additional constraint on the rate of temperature change in
addition to the long-term temperature stabilization target. This scenario reflects concerns that
damages might not be only dependent on absolute temperature change but also on the rate of
temperature change (see e.g. Peck and Teisberg, 1994, Alcamo and Kreileman 1996).5
In order to assess the importance of “what”-flexibility we combine each of the two
control schemes with two alternative assumptions on the scope of greenhouse gases that are
explicitly included. Variant CO2 covers the case where only carbon emissions are subject to
direct emission control measures. Variant Multigas explicitly includes various greenhouse gas
emissions (in our case: CO2 and CH4) within the abatement strategy. In total, we thus obtain
four scenarios whose characteristics are summarized in Table 4. Across all scenarios,
comprehensive “where”-flexibility applies, i.e. emissions will be abated where it is cheapest.
Table 4: Central case scenarios
Control scheme Emission s.t. control policy
CO2-TTarget Temperature target CO2 only
Multigas-TTarget Temperature rate CO2 and CH4
CO2-TRate Temperature target CO2 only
Multigas-TRate Temperature rate CO2 and CH4
Abstracting from external costs of climate change, we simply investigate the least-cost
way to satisfy external policy constraints with respect to the choice of the control scheme and
the scope of GHG emissions covered. Our scenarios are thus based on a cost-effectiveness
paradigm rather than comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Without accounting for benefits
                                                
5 We approximate an upper bound on the decadal rate of change by specifying a set of temperature targets for
each decade beginning in 2030.
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from emission abatement, compliance to the exogenous emission control scheme necessarily
involves global adjustment costs vis-à-vis the unconstrained business-as-usual.6
In the exposition of results from our large-scale multi-sector, multi-region CGE model
PACE, we focus on global cost implications across the different scenarios. At the regional
level, compliance costs will to a large extent depend on the allocation of the (endogenous)
global emission budget which emerges from the respective emission control policies. This
leads to the fundamental issue of burden sharing, i.e. the question how abatement duties - or
likewise emission entitlements – shall be allocated across countries. This issue has already
dominated climate negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol and proved extremely difficult to
resolve. We do not want to enter the controversial and highly subjective debate on equity
principles here and adopt the economist’s typical device to separate efficiency from equity
considerations (handling some exogenous distributional objective by means of hypothetical
lump-sum transfers).
Note that, abstracting from secondary income effects, the initial emission entitlement
does not affect global efficiency given full flexibility.7
Table 5 reports the global compliance costs across our four central scenarios. The
qualitative results confirm basic economic intuition: (i) imposition of a decadal rate constraint
on top of the temperature target will be more restrictive for the global economy and thus
generate larger adjustment costs, and (ii) “what”-flexibility in terms of a multigas abatement
approach reduces overall compliance costs for a given control scheme vis-à-vis a CO2-only
strategy. The concrete quantitative figures show that global costs are relatively moderate
ranging from a loss in lifetime BaU consumption of 0.01 % (scenario: Multigas-TTarget ) up to
0.22 % (scenario: Multigas-TRate). However, the differences across scenarios are quite
substantial. First, we see that hedging against “larger” decadal rates of temperature change is
quite expensive – in fact the compliance costs are an order of magnitude higher as compared
                                                
6 In principle, second-best effects such as the interaction of emission control schemes with existing
distortionary taxes might offset the direct emission control costs yielding a double dividend (see Goulder
1995, Bovenberg 1999). In our analysis, we deliberately neglect the incorporation of major initial distortions
owing to the aggregate nature of our global model that makes it difficult to reflect specific tax and transfer
systems as well as institutional constraints – such as labor market rigidities – in an appropriate manner.
7 In our simulations we assume that in any period the BaU carbon emissions are scaled uniformly across
regions to result in the (endogenous) global GHG emissions that are consistent with the temperature
constraint. From an equity perspective, such an entitlement rule would reflect a sovereignty approach, where
projected BaU emissions constitute a status quo right.
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to the respective scenarios that only involve a long-term temperature target. Second, “what”-
flexibility provides substantial efficiency gains cutting down the compliance costs vis-à-vis a
CO2-only strategy by roughly a half.
Table 5: Global adjustment costs expressed as Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in
income (% present value of BaU consumption).
Temperature target Decadal rate
CO2-TTarget Multigas-TTarget CO2-TRate Multigas-TRate
-0.02 -0.01 -0.22 -0.11
Figure 5 depicts the trajectory of the global mean temperature for the central case
scenarios. Policies that only aim at limiting the increase in global mean temperature in 2100
at 90 % of the BaU value involve little temperature decreases vis-à-vis the business-as-usual
until the mid of the century. Policies that in addition limit the decadal rate of temperature
change are much more restrictive and involve distinct temperature decreases from BaU
already in initial periods.
BaU
CO2 - TTarget Multigas - TRate
CO2 - TRate Multigas - TRate
Figure 5: Global mean temperature (degrees Celsius)
Figure 6 illustrates the carbon emission profiles that emerge from the imposition of
temperature targets and rate constraints. We see that the long-term temperature targets
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without decadal rate constraint allow for substantial increases in emission levels from current
levels to the mid-century.
BaU
CO2 - TTarget Multigas - TRate
CO2 - TRate Multigas - TRate
Figure 6: CO2 Emissions from fossil fuels (Tg of C eq.)
The cutback requirements from BaU are relatively modest till 2050 but thereafter
emissions must be reduced substantially to achieve the temperature target. In other words:
abatement is shifted to the second half of the century where costs in present value terms
simply decrease by discounting. Additional rate constraints imply larger cutbacks from BaU
levels already in the initial decades. The climate dynamics reflecting past emissions then
allow to increase emissions from 2040 onwards with a steep increase in the period between
2040-2050, some stable emission levels between 2050-2070 and a final increase towards BaU
emission levels at the end of the century. The discontinuous step-function type emission
trajectories for the scenarios with decadal rate constraints reflect the discrete bounds on rate
increase. Due to the latter, there is no leeway for smoothing the carbon profile as is the case
for the target-only scenarios. “What”-flexibility allows for higher CO2 emissions for both
climate control schemes (Target and Rate) since CH4 abatement will be undertaken whenever
it is cheaper.
The carbon emission profiles for the different scenarios are an indicator for the potential
magnitude of compliance costs. The less carbon emissions must be cut back and the later in
time abatement takes place the less costly the control scheme is – not surprisingly the
comparison of profiles along these lines reveal the Multigas-TTarget as the least-cost scenario.
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Figure 7 shows the magnitude of carbon taxes that would be required to achieve the
long-term temperature target and - for scenarios CO2-TRate and Multigas-TRate - to meet the
rate constraints.
CO2 - TTarget Multigas - TRate
CO2 - TRate Multigas - TRate
Figure 7: Incremental value of carbon permit / carbon tax (US$2000/metric ton C Eq)
The course of the tax trajectories mirror the characteristics of the emission trajectories.
When climate policies only aim at long-term temperature targets there is a continuous
increase in carbon taxes towards the end of the century reflecting economic rationality to
postpone abatement as long as possible. Rate constraints trigger very high shadow prices in
the initial periods whereas towards the end of the model horizon prices become very small or
even zero (as rate constraints may no longer be binding).
Figure 8 illustrates the tradeoffs between CO2 and CH4 based on efficiency prices that is
the ratio of shadow values for these gases with respect to the long-term temperature target
(scenario: Multigas-TTarget). As indicated by the natural science of the climate system this
ratio increases over time since the impact of an additional emission unit CH4 on the global
mean temperature goes up relatively to the impact of an additional emission unit of CO2.
With its relatively short lifetime, the value of CH4 increases as one approaches the
temperature ceiling. The kink in 2080 reflects the “break-point” where the shorter lifetime of
CH4 vis-à-vis CO2 does no longer matter with respect to the terminal temperature target.
Figure 8 highlights the pitfalls of the Global Warming Potential (GWP) approach for
establishing equivalence among greenhouse gases. Price rations may vary substantially over
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time (in addition they are sensitive to the ultimate temperature goal – see Manne and Richels
2001).
Ratio of shadow values for CH4 and CO2
on atmospheric temperature
Figure 8: Ratio of shadow values for CH4 and CO2 on atmospheric temperature
7.  Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the importance of “what”-flexibility for alternative
emission control schemes that prescribe long-term temperature targets and eventually impose
additional constraints on the rate of temperature change. In line with previous analysis, we
find that “what”-flexibility can provide substantial global efficiency gains as cost-efficient
abatement options for non-CO2 gases are directly taken into account. In our simulations, we
have identified very large insurance premia when hedging against too rapid rates of
temperature increase. We have also highlighted the shortcomings of the GWP approach to
represent the contribution of different greenhouse gases to radiative forcing.
From a methodological point of view, the primary objective of our paper has been to lay
out a multi-sector, multi-region CGE model PACE that entails a careful baseline calibration
and provides a self-consistent simple representation of the connection between greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change (radiative forcing and temperature).
We close with several caveats. Although our model captures important economic aspects
of long-term emission control schemes, it is only a crude approximation of the real world’s
technologies, preferences, endowments, etc. This applies in particular to longer-term analysis
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where substantial uncertainties about the future economic development prevail. Furthermore,
our reduced from representation of the climate dynamics is very simplistic. Against this
background we caution against too literal an interpretation of our numerical results.
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